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ince 1961, the long-running, award-winning Four Corners Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) current affairs programme, has represented
two well-known events of Australian military history in Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore,
aired on 25 April 1988, and No Prisoners on Australian deserters at the fall of
Singapore, which aired on 11 March 2002. Both programmes, reported by Chris
Masters, purport to investigate Anzac mythology. Comparing and contrasting them
provides insights into the genre of documentary history and the particular investigative
style of Four Corners. Media studies analysis of Four Corners by Alan McKee, Stuart
Cunningham, Toby Miller and Robert Pullan notes that its style is that of setting out to
‘expose the truth’ in a way that is not objective but is guided by a sense of partiality
driven by the journalists’ idea that they are reporting in the ‘interests of the public’.
Rather than objectively setting out both sides of an argument, the style of Four Corners
is to partially pursue a line of inquiry that is meant to ‘expose the truth’ by taking the
side of the argument that the reporters believe is in the public interest.1 What type of
history does adapting the investigative style of Four Corners produce in the
programmes covering Australian military history in the television documentary genre?
THE DEBATE OVER TELEVISION HISTORY DOCUMENTARIES
The phenomenon of historical documentaries on television has produced a nuanced
debate among historians and documentary makers about the ways television history
works.  This debate provides insights into understanding Four Corners’ approach to
history in these two programmes on the Anzac legend. The investigative and argument-
based format that Australian media analysts have described Four Corners as regularly
employing in its documentaries echoes Bill Nichols’ classic description of the expository
genre of documentary film.2 Nichols noted that documentary claims to be one of the
‘discourses of sobriety’, such as science, economics, politics and history, which purport
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to describe what is ‘real’ or ‘tell us the truth’. Nichols, however, argues that
documentaries only represent the world and give us a likeness of it; they do not reflect
it. He refers to documentaries as being ‘instrumental’, meaning that they outline an
argument that seeks to change peoples’ opinions.
The format that Nichols outlines imposes a strong narrative structure on many
historical documentary makers. Writing from the perspective of an historian, rather than
a film maker, David Cannadine suggested a contrast between historical writing and
documentary making when he wrote that ‘work being undertaken by historians today
tries to present many voices and different viewpoints; but as written and presented,
media history is still largely confined to linear narrative.’3 Taylor Downing, a television
documentary producer, has reiterated Cannadine’s point that the medium of television
tends to go for ‘great narrative, great story telling’.4
In making out a narrative argument using film, often complex historiographical
debates are ignored. Ian Jarvie, philosopher and film theorist, argues that in television
history, such as the BBC’s 1997 The Nazis: A Warning From History, ‘it is not made
explicit that what the viewer is getting are interesting and provocative interpretations
that may or may not gain the assent of other historians.’ He noted that ‘the narrator sets
out the interpretation, sometimes with graphics, and then interview selections are
deployed to give factual feel to the interpretation.’ Jarvie remarked that given the need
to have a clear uninterrupted story line it is not surprising that ‘the point the interview
makes always coincides with that being made by the narration!’5
It is also worth assessing the ideas of Ken Burns, whose historical documentary
format was much vaunted in the 1990s with both the popular and critical success of his
film The Civil War (1990). Outlining his approach in 1995, Burns attacked historians ‘for
having abandoned their role as tribal story-tellers who craft tales about the past in
which the nation can find its identity’.6 Burns assumes that film cannot approach the
analytical and interrogative approach of text and is best left to dealing with emotion and
the story-telling process. He says: ‘Film is not equipped to do what a book does, which
is to attain profound levels of meaning and texture. But film has the power to reach
profound levels of emotion’.7
In the context of debates on television history in Australia, Sue Castrique, a script
writer and film maker, has also made the point that because of the importance of the
narrative in many Australian documentaries, ‘the audience is stuck with a narrator who
like a bossy tour operator drives you in a straight chronological line’.8 Michelle Arrow, a
collaborator in the making of Australian documentaries, has noted that this need to
follow a strong narrative means that differences in interpretations among historians
seldom get airtime in Australian television history documentaries. She argues that
television seems to be better at personal narratives than debates and that the format
strongly requires a beginning, middle and an end.9
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The Four Corners historical productions Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore and No
Prisoners quickly outline tough questions the programmes will tackle in probing the
meaning of the Anzac mythology associated with Gallipoli and the fall of Singapore. In
the programme on Gallipoli, it starts off with asking why thousands of young Australians
go so far out of their way when travelling in Europe to visit the Gallipoli battlefield that
the programme is filming. Chris Masters says: ‘It is very difficult to get a clear
expression of why they have gone to such considerable trouble to be here’. He then
looks at the prominent place that Gallipoli and Anzac have in Australian contemporary
life and asks deeper questions: ‘Why do we celebrate War? Why do we celebrate
defeat?’10 In the Four Corners episode on the fall of Singapore, No Prisoners, the
questions asked appear much more pointed and uncomfortable as they are outlined in
the images and interviews that opened the show:
Chris Masters: Tonight, Four Corners confronts the big questions that
emerge from the debacle that end the British Empire. Why were the
Allied Forces so comprehensively defeated and how much was
desertion among Australian troops to blame?
Peter Elphick, (historian and author of Singapore: The Pregnable
Fortress, 1995, first major book to make the accusations that large
numbers of Australians deserted at the fall of Singapore): I believe
the Australians were the first to desert in any great numbers.
Chris Masters: This British author has named alleged Australian
deserters. We go in search of them.11
From these introductory remarks, it seems the approach of Four Corners is the
investigative journalism style, ‘exposing the truth’ through a convincing argument
format, usually found in Four Corners’ regular coverage of contemporary social and
political issues.12 But in dealing with Anzac mythology, which is strong in the media and
popular culture, can the Four Corners investigative style completely pursue difficult
questions that can lead to uncomfortable answers?
ANZAC MYTHOLOGY IN FOUR CORNERS’ ARGUMENT ON GALLIPOLI
The Four Corners historical productions on Anzac mythology, having stated the
questions that they will tackle, quickly set out to construct the arguments that the
programmes will pursue and substantiate using sound and images. This is done very
much in the manner that Jarvie has described in his assessment of television history,
whereby only the images and oral history interviews that confirm the argument presented
by the narrator are used. Key elements of these arguments are grounded in the very
Anzac mythology that one would expect Four Corners to be investigating. Perhaps this is
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due to the documentary style of the producer of the programme, Harvey Broadbent. He
had migrated from Britain to Australia with a degree in Middle Eastern Studies.
Broadbent has regularly indicated in his publications a willingness to uncritically embrace
the Anzac legend.13 He had worked on a number of historical feature programmes for the
ABC and had prepared for a decade to do a documentary on Gallipoli using oral history
testimony he had gathered on film. In 1990, he used these interviews, which he had cut
down and heavily edited for Four Corners, in the maudlin but fascinating documentary
featuring extended interviews with veterans from both sides of the conflict, Gallipoli: The
Boys Who Came Home.14 Broadbent wrote of his approach: ‘I have become
consciousness of not wanting to debunk myths purely for the sake of journalistic impact,
particularly because some of the events and performances of the Anzac initiation to war
are worthy of admiration’.15
In Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore, the voice narration (done by Chris Masters, the
programme’s reporter who also seems enamoured of the Anzac legend) starts with the
argument: ‘Australia is different. Australians are different because of Gallipoli.’ The
programme at its beginning ties Gallipoli and Australian nationalism together suggesting
that an over-sentimental trip through Anzac mythology is about to begin. This is at odds
with the asking-difficult-questions approach that is part of the Four Corners style. The
programme compares the young visitors to the Gallipoli battlefield to the young Anzacs
of 1915 and suggests a mystical communion between the two groups:
About 13,000 Australians and New Zealanders are buried in these
hills. Each year about the same number find their way here. For every
Anzac gravestone there is a visitor every year. Mostly they are the
same as their forebears. They are as brown, if not as sleek. They are
as adventurous, curious, open-hearted. They are as keen to be
admired, to return home with a bevy of souvenirs. They are as hard
drinking, as chauvinistic and as callow. Weeks earlier they may well
have been stealing trams and carousing at the Munich Beer Festival.
But as they near Anzac Cove they become quiet. There is something
about this place that they find bewildering.
Given this comparison, it is not surprising that videotapes of Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore
are used by Turkey-based travel agents to show their Australian visitors on their package
tours on the day-long bus ride down to the Gallipoli Peninsula from Istanbul. On their
pilgrimage to the original Anzacs they are also shown Peter Weir’s 1981 film Gallipoli,
which also plays up the links between Anzacs and Australian nationalism.16 This use of
the Four Corners programme on Gallipoli suggests that it is not likely to be a rigorous
examination of Anzac mythology. Rather, it is more likely to be cast in the model of ‘tribal
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story-teller’ and leave Australians with their myths upheld rather than analysed and
exposed.   
When describing the Anzacs of 1915, Masters is just as sanguine about embracing
the Anzac mythology as Peter Weir. He concludes when narrating over the excerpt from
the country athletic track race of Weir’s fictional movie Gallipoli a film in which Weir
certainly fulfils the role of ‘tribal story-teller’ for the Australian nation in that he portrays
the Anzacs as handsome heroes who were pioneers from the Australian frontier:17
The first men to sign up, as in the movie Gallipoli, were of the finest
physique. After a century of coping with the endurance course that
was pioneer Australia we had created a nation of athletes, if not a
nation.
Masters’ words echo those of C.E.W. Bean, the Australian official historian of World War
I. In the 1920s, Bean fashioned the Anzac myth which cast the men that were going off
to war as part of a nation of ‘rugged bushmen’ and that the characteristics they had
developed in the bush made them the best soldiers.18 Four Corners draws freely upon
Bean as a source. An actor even re-enacts Bean’s life as the chronicler of the Anzac
story at Gallipoli. Masters endorses Bean’s mythology surrounding the Anzacs when he
says: ‘Charles Bean wrote admiringly of their casual unmistakable gait, their
carelessness under fire, their absence of display. Bean began to see something that he
would come to describe as the Anzac spirit’. Four Corners actively and uncritically
employs Bean’s literary techniques to build the Anzac legend rather than analyse it.
When covering Anzacs at the battle for Lone Pine, it notes that ‘Bean records their
muted conversation.’ ‘“Can you find room for me beside Jimmy there”, says one young
Australian, “Him and me are mates, an’ we’re goin’ over together.”’ Bean uses the quote
as indeed Four Corners does, to prove in Beans’ words: ‘The strongest bond in the
Australian Imperial Force was that between a man and his mate.’ 19
Four Corners, however, omitted the work of more recent historians who interrogated
this aspect of Anzac mythology using statistical analysis of the recruitment of the first
Australian Imperial Force. The military historians appearing in the programme, James
Robert Rhodes, from Britain, and Denis Winter and Peter Andreas Pedersen, both then
at the Australian War Memorial, are mainly used to analyse the strategies behind the
battle rather than assess the Anzac legend. However, Winter’s ideas that he would later
publish from his work at the Australian War Memorial, that the Anzacs were not ‘country
boys’ but comprised of many recent British immigrants to Australia still very loyal to
Britain, are not used.20
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The historians who had done critical research on the Anzac legend that Bean
fashions from Gallipoli, did not participate in the programme. This supports Cannadine’s
and Arrow’s point that television history has problems dealing with presenting the
different interpretations of historians as it interrupts the flow of the narrative or story
being told. In the 1980s, as Jenny Macleod has documented, Bean and the Anzac
legend were undergoing intense scrutiny and debate by historians in Australia.21 The
statistical analysis of who were the first Anzacs done by historian Lloyd Robson in the
1970s was widely circulated in university history courses during the 1980s and
suggested that most Anzacs did not come from the Australian bush but from urban
areas. Historian Ken Inglis’ work on how Bean fashioned the Anzac legend in the official
war histories was also well-known.22 Robson was very critical of Bean’s constant
attempts to play up the Anzacs as ‘boys from the bush’ who drew their values from the
frontier, and that these bush values were at the core of those of the Australian forces,
and indeed the values of the Australian nation. The most common occupations,
according to Robson, were industrial workers from New South Wales, a dominant state,
while recruits from farming occupations were negligible in Victoria, also a major state.
The more rural states of Queensland and Tasmania had a greater number of men from
the country but these were small in comparison to the large numbers from urban
occupations.23
In the Four Corners programme on Gallipoli, as in Bean’s work, we hear of ‘wine
growers from Barossa Valley and cane growers from North Queensland’ but urban
recruits are not mentioned. This is odd given the testimony from the veterans used in the
programme that hints that they were urban workers. Frank Parker briefly mentions in
passing regularly seeing ships during his pre-war life at Port Melbourne and never
guessing that he would be one day on one in uniform. Leopold ‘Bill’ De Saxe speaks of
Gladesville in Sydney, and nothing about the bush. Even when we hear the Turkish side
of the Gallipoli story, the bush image continues. Masters introduces Adil Sahin, a Turkish
veteran aged seventeen in 1915, with the words, ‘like many of the Australians, Adil
Sahin, was a farmer training to be a killer’. Thus, it is no surprise to hear in the next
sentence that ‘the Turks, were, as they are now, a rugged lot’.
Four Corners uses the mythology of the Anzacs as bushmen to explain the success
on 25 April 1915 of a few small advance Anzac parties approaching the top of Chunuk
Bair, the crest of a high ridge, far inland, which had commanding view of the surrounding
country, including the Dardenelles waterways on the other side of the Gallipoli Peninsula.
The programme implies that if these few Anzacs had taken Chunuk Bair they could have
won the entire Gallipoli campaign.24 Masters says ‘to have got this far so quickly was a
remarkable feat of physical endurance alone’. We are then told that the Anzacs who
reached the slopes of Chunuk Bair ‘were a mixed lot from the backblocks of Australia
and New Zealand’. The programme quickly cuts to an excerpt from an interview with
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veteran Frank Parker, who remembers how they could see the sea on the other side of
the Gallipoli Peninsula when members of his battalion were approaching the slopes of
Chunuk Bair on that day. Frank Parker, however, was certainly not from the ‘backblocks’.
According to the embarkation records of the First Australian Imperial Force, Frank
Parker, before he enlisted, was a Railway Porter who lived in Port Melbourne.
Other Gallipoli veterans interviewed, judging from their enlistment records, also
appear not to be bushmen: Tom Usher from Queensland was a planning machinist from
inner city Brisbane; ‘Bill’ De Saxe was a bank clerk from the New South Wales coastal
town of Moruya; Basil Holmes seems to be an orchardist from a family in Sydney’s
affluent North Shore; while Lionel Simpson, who was in the 8th Light Horse and could
perhaps be expected to been a bushman, was a carpenter from the Victorian town of
Alexandra, up in the mountains around Melbourne.25 We hear nothing, however, of the
veterans’ backgrounds, as that would ruin a good story.
Every time a veteran is interviewed, their age when they joined is given. Seventy
years after the event, not many men who joined in their thirties and forties are going to
be around to give testimony. The impression conveyed by having interviews with all but
one who joined when they were teenagers or in their early twenties is the Anzacs were,
as Bean claimed, ‘country boys’. Four Corners uses this to reaffirm the connection with
the young visitors on pilgrimages to Anzac Cove as being cast in the same mould as
their ‘forebears’. This point is made in the introduction to the programme and affirmed at
its conclusion. Robson also debunked the impression that the Anzacs were ‘country
boys’ by highlighting statistically a good proportion of older men in their late twenties and
thirties, even a small number in their forties. According to his data, fourteen per cent
were between eighteen to nineteen years of age, and thirty-eight per cent were between
twenty and twenty-four years of age. The rest were over twenty-five years of age.26
Four Corners also heaps high praise on Australian journalist Keith Murdoch,
depicting him as a frank and plain speaking Australian whose account of Gallipoli as a
disaster pursued by incompetent British commanders single handedly put an end to the
campaign. Masters notes that the Gallipoli campaign by September 1915 had resulted in
thousands of men being killed unnecessarily and says ‘they probably would have lost a
lot more but without the intervention of this man [picture of Murdoch]’. Murdoch’s
September 1915 letter to the Australian government, which was also circulated among
members of the British government, did add to the British government’s re-evaluation of
the Gallipoli campaign. But even Bean in his official history puts it in the context of the
review of the campaign that was going on in the War Office, Whitehall, and the
government; he does not go as far as the Four Corners’ judgement that one frank
Australian journalist’s report put an end to the slaughter.27 Here, Four Corners seems to
be making a subtle connection between its own reputation for investigative journalism
exposing the truth in the public interest with that of Murdoch.
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The letter is certainly part of the Anzac mythology. Murdoch wrote that the Anzacs,
whom he idealised, were being sacrificed in a senseless slaughter because of British
incompetence. Masters interprets the Murdoch letter in nationalistic terms:
The Murdoch letter comes close to a declaration of independence.
There is nothing restrained, measured, or discreet about it. In this
sense, it is a masterpiece of plain speaking. It is passionately pro-
Australian and vitriolically anti-British, or rather anti-British command.
Murdoch described how British commanders in their yachts well off shore and away from
the front made bad decisions that sent thousands of Anzacs to their deaths. He went
further and wrote that ‘the continuous and ghastly bungling over the Dardenelles
enterprise was to be expected from such a General Staff as the British Army possess, so
far as I have seen it’. Four Corners plays up anti-British sentiment and Australian
nationalism when it uses just one quote from the letter: ‘What can you expect of men
who have never worked seriously, who lived for their appearance and for social
distinction and self satisfaction, and who are now called on to conduct a gigantic war’.28
Four Corners does interrogate Anzac mythology only once in the ninety-two minutes
of the programme. And this interestingly deals with the anti-British theme of the
mythology. It examines the reality behind the well-known scene of the end of the movie
Gallipoli. This is when the Western Australian 10th Light Horse Regiment is about to go
over the trenches in an attack on the infamous Nek on 7 August 1915 knowing they
faced certain death. To build up the image of the Anzacs as rugged men from the bush
who are irreverent to British authority, Four Corners has previously drawn freely upon the
movie, suggesting that it represents reality. For the scenes at the Nek, the movie
Gallipoli is by and large accurate, with a failure to synchronise watches leading to the
bombardment of Turkish trenches stopping seven minutes too soon, enabling the
Turkish machine gunners to get back into their trenches. The first wave of 150 men from
the Light Horse was cut to pieces, as were the second, third, and fourth waves, each of
150 men.
Four Corners checks the film Gallipoli for accuracy and discovers the movie’s
impression that a British officer ordered the attack at the Nek to continue despite
pleading by an Australian officer is wrong. It was actually an Australian officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. ‘Bull’ Antill, the Brigade-Major, who gave the order for the
attack to continue after the second wave. The programme shows correspondence that
reveals that Antill’s fellow officer Lieutenant-Colonel Noel Murray Brazier, who attempted
to have the third wave of attacked stopped, was very critical of Antill’s decision to persist.
On the day, Brazier pleaded with Antill to stop the third wave because he was unable to
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contact Brigadier-General Frederick Hughes who eventually called the attack off. In the
confusion, however, a fourth wave also went over to their deaths.29
The programme, however, uses this well-known climax of the movie Gallipoli to
illustrate the memories of trooper Lionel Simpson, aged twenty-six, the last survivor of
the Nek to pass away. Simpson’s words are used as a voice over when in the movie the
character, Archy Hamilton, a champion runner, keeps sprinting towards the Turkish
trenches and is riddled with bullets. In contrast, Simpson, of the 8th Light Horse from
Victoria, which had carried out the first and second waves, was carrying a plank to be
thrown over the Turkish barbed wire and noticed that everyone was falling behind him
until he too was shot, and then he ambled back to the Australian trenches. Using the
fictional film Gallipoli to illustrate Simpson’s memories confirms Nichols’ idea of
documentary being representative of reality rather than simply reflecting it. At other
places, Four Corners uses film footage in a similar manner. Earlier in the programme,
footage of the Austro-Hungarian battleship Szent Istvan on 10 June 1918 capsizing and
sinking with its crew running up its side onto its bottom like squirrels before the ship
quickly sinks is used to illustrate how one of the six lost battleships of the British and
French fleet, the Bouzet, was sunk in a similar manner by the Turkish forts and mines in
the Dardenelles on 18 March 1915. No archival film footage of this exists. The purpose is
to represent how British naval arrogance and incompetence led to defeat, which is part
of Four Corners’ argument.
In Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore, it is clear that Four Corners abandons much of its
traditional role as an investigative programme when it embraces the argument that the
Anzacs laid down national values. The reasons for this could due be the nature of
television history as a story teller as has been observed by Cannadine, Downing and
Burns overseas and Castrique and Arrow in Australia. It could, however, also be due to
Broadbent as the producer who discarded Four Corners’ usual investigative journalism
style in making Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore.
ANZAC MYTHOLOGY IN FOUR CORNERS’ ARGUMENT ON THE FALL OF SINGAPORE
Broadbent’s strong influence over Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore makes it worth examining
another programme in which Four Corners explores Anzac mythology to see if it employs
the usual investigative journalism approach without him as producer. The Four Corners
documentary on the fall of Singapore, No Prisoners, marked the sixtieth anniversary of
the battle. It is only forty-five minutes long, compared to the ninety-two minute long
special on Gallipoli. Sticking to the Four Corners regular running time may mean that the
fall of Singapore programme could have less an aura of being in the mould of an epic
story. No Prisoners was produced by its regular current affairs executive producer, Bruce
Belsham, and regular current affairs producer Lin Buckfield. Belsham himself had
worked in the ABC Documentary Unit and produced the 1997 challenging television
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history on Aboriginal and European relations, Frontier. Buckfield was an awarding
winning current affairs producer.
Although No Prisoners begins by setting out to answer the question of whether
Australian soldiers deserted the front in the final days of the fall of Singapore, just one
veteran is questioned about this topic, Roydon Cornford. He was named as a deserter by
Peter Elphick in his 1995 book, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress. Only the last ten
minutes of the programme No Prisoners deals directly with the issue of Australian
deserters. Like the Four Corners programme on Gallipoli, most of No Prisoners uses the
recorded testimony of veterans and plays up the Anzac mythology of Australians as the
best soldiers because their rugged character, which was supposedly shaped by the
Australian bush. To devote less than ten minutes to seriously examining this issue is not
surprising. Among historians of the Malayan Campaign, it is common knowledge that
Australians were absent without leave from the front in the last days of the fall of
Singapore. At its very end the programme asks three historians, Peter Elphick, Peter
Dennis and Brian Farrell whether Australians did desert. All three historians agree that
Australian soldiers did desert.
Faced with all this, Four Corners still sets out to debunk the claims that Australians
did desert by trying to discredit Peter Elphick, who had revived the controversy over
Australian ‘stragglers’ or ‘deserters’ at the fall of Singapore in his 1995 book. Four
Corners uses the investigative journalism style that it employs in its current affairs
programmes which take one side of the argument and pursue it because the journalists
believe it is in the public interest. Four Corners sets its sights on Elphick by attempting to
prove that the two Australian soldiers that he names as deserters in his book, ‘Captain
Blackwood’ and Roydon Cornford, were not deserters. A ‘Captain Blackwood’ was
named by Elphick as having led a group of Australian deserters on board the ship, the
Empire Star. In the interview excerpt Masters tells Elphick:
 Chris Masters: There’s no record of Captain Blackwood in the
[Australian] 8th Division. What do you make of that?
Peter Elphick: Er, well, maybe they got the name wrong.
Four Corners is right, but from the website set up by the programme with the full
transcript of the interview, Elphick’s response is much longer than this, and he discusses
his source. It would have been more objective and fairer to hear the whole response
from Elphick. Just taking the first sentence from a much longer response to the question
that discusses the source makes Elphick appear to be arguing against the evidence. His
longer response seems to indicate he believes that his own source may be mistaken.
Elphick says that the name came from information from a Royal Air Force Squadron
Leader, Steve Stephens, who had permission to be evacuated from Singapore aboard
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the Empire Star, and recalled hearing over the ship’s internal speaker system requests
for a ‘Captain Blackwood of the AIF’ to report to the bridge.30 Steve Stephens may have
got the name wrong, not the list of officers in the Australian 8th Division. Still, of course,
Elphick should have cross checked the list of 8th Division officers.
Four Corners also then takes up the case of Roydon Cornford. Cornford is heard
describing the chaos in the last few days of the fall of Singapore and how he and his
friends in the 2/19th Battalion were ‘left cut off and leaderless’ when retreating from the
advancing Japanese. The excerpts from the interview with Cornford do not shed much
light on what he was doing or why he was doing it at all because it is cut up into parts
that don’t seem to run together. One moment he is describing how he is ‘pushing through
the jungle’ then he is interrupted by the narrator, who only describes Cornford and his
four friends as ‘cut off and leaderless’. Then all of a sudden they are in a little boat which
encounters the Empire Star with hundreds of soldiers on it. The soldiers on board
lowered a scrambling net, and Cornford and his friends climbed aboard the Empire Star.
Four Corners fails to mention that it is 12 February, three days before the surrender
of Singapore. Only when all the soldiers became prisoners of war could they legitimately
escape without permission. Escaping without permission is technically desertion. The
narrator then tells the audience that Cornford helped defend the ship from attack by
Japanese aircraft, and ‘upon arrival in Java, he was briefly detained before volunteering
to return to the line until captured by the Japanese.’ He was a prisoner on the Burma-
Thailand Railway. Then he miraculously survived one of the Japanese hellships, the
Rakuyo Maru, which was transporting prisoners to Japan when it was sunk by an
American submarine on 17 September 1944. He described how he floated on a raft for
three days before an American warship picked up the surviving seven out of the original
eighteen who were on the raft. After this description is given, Chris Masters starts
questioning Elphick:
Chris Masters: You’ve also named a ‘Roy Cornford’ – you say
deserted by his own admission. This he denies. He gives a good
account of what happened to him. Indeed, he joined the frontline
again when he was returned to Java. Were you wrong to call him a
deserter?
Peter Elphick: No if I am wrong then so was the author of the book
who actually interviewed Roy Cornford, and he said that Roy
Cornford, on his own admission, was a deserter. And I took that
verbatim from the book.
Chris Masters: Did you talk to Roy Cornford?
Peter Elphick: No, I didn’t.
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Chris Masters: But you should have, shouldn’t you if you are going to
call him a deserter.
Peter Elphick: Well, it’s a moot point. Would it have been worth my
while to journey out to Australia to interview one man? I don’t think
so.
Neither Masters nor Elphick are being as open and frank about things as they could be.
In his own book, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress, Elphick cites as his source
Cornford’s interview in Joan and Clay Blair’s Return to the River Kwai. Although Cornford
appears to have given to the authors an open description of what happened to him, he
does not say he is a deserter.31 Thus, Elphick is certainly misusing his source to get the
interpretation that Cornford is ‘a self-confessed deserter’. According to Return from the
River Kwai, Cornford and his friends were taken off the Empire Star at Java before it left
to go to Australia and they were jailed. The captain of the ship accused them of being
among the Australian and British soldiers who forcibly boarded the ship with Tommy
guns. Of course they had not been involved in this, as is clear from Cornford’s testimony
on Four Corners.
Masters, however, also certainly knows that Cornford escaped from Singapore well
before he became a prisoner of war, and hence was technically a deserter, and also has
most likely read the account in Return from the River Kwai from the authors’ interview
with Cornford. The most interesting question that emerges is perhaps why he does not
consider what they were doing as desertion and what were his motives for escaping
even though he most likely knew that it was technically deserting. Also, one of the
documents that Four Corners briefly shows in between cutting from Elphick to Cornford
is that drawn up by the Australian army listing Australian soldiers who escaped from
Singapore without permission and who are to be regarded as deserters. This is from
Brigadier Arthur Blackburn, commander of the Australian forces in Java, giving a list of
ninety-five deserters from Malaya, Singapore and elsewhere which was drawn up ‘to
prevent any of them being confused with genuine escapees’.32 In the document there
were seventy-five ‘names of deserters from Malaya and Singapore and 16 were
members of reinforcements returned from Singapore.’33 Cornford’s name is on that list.
Having acquired this document and presumably others in the file, Four Corners ignores
them.
In the programme, the voice narration simply says ‘documents reveal no evidence of
Australians court-martialled for desertion’ to suggest there were no desertions. The
documents in the same file as the list of deserters on the Empire Star suggest that the
Australian government was unlikely to initiate court martials after what was described as
the already ‘undesirable publicity’ given to reports of Australians deserting. These and
other documents that Four Corners presumably got hold of in addition to those that it
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showed briefly on camera must have indicated that something significant was going on.
The commander of the Australian 8th Division General Bennett’s own report says that
‘under 5,000’ Australians were holding the perimeter at the front at the time of cease fire
on 15 February 1942.34 On 17 and 18 February 1942, over 14,000 Australians reported
to Changi as prisoners of war. Of these, about 3000 Australians were in hospital as
patients and personnel.35 The Report on Operations of the 8th Division compiled by
Colonel J.H. Thyer also suggests a high figure of Australians absent without leave when
he writes that ‘in the last stages at most two-thirds of those fit to fight were manning the
final perimeters’.36 The figure of Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Ashkanasy, the Deputy
Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) of the 8th Division, was only 4500 Australians
manning the perimeter on 12 February 1942.37 Ashkanasy himself escaped from
Singapore with forty men in a small sampan before surrender and later joined Australian
soldiers fighting the Japanese in New Guinea. So the real question is what were
approximately 6000 Australians who appear to have been absent without leave doing?
But this is not the question that Four Corners asks. Instead it says there are unfounded
rumours of Australian deserters, and let’s go and find out by asking one or two veterans.
Masters simply asks Cornford: ‘Are you a self confessed deserter?’ Conford says no,
and that is it.
Work published by one of the historians interviewed by Four Corners, Brian Farrell of
the National University of Singapore, uses all these documents and indicates that a large
number of Australians were not at the front, and attempts to explain this.38 Given that the
Four Corners team had come to Singapore to interview him, surely they had read what
he had written. What Four Corners tries to do is suggest that these allegations are those
of a lone ‘pommy’ historian, Peter Elphick, who has not checked his facts. Thus, by
discrediting Elphick they seek to dismiss the allegations. At a seminar a few days after
the interview, Farrell expressed frustration with the Four Corners team in that they
seemed unable to accept what he was telling them.39 Farrell’s answer to the question as
to why there were so many Australians absent without leave is a very perceptive. A hint
of it is given in the excerpt taken from the interview he gave to Four Corners about the
army being trapped and falling apart from the top down.40
In 1999, Farrell had published on how badly led the Australians were in the defence
of Singapore. He described how in the final days before the fall of Singapore Lieutenant-
General Gordon Bennett, commanding the Australian 8th Division, was too busy planning
his own escape and how his brigade commanders failed their troops. The commander of
the Australian 27th Brigade, Duncan Struan Maxell, believing that everything was lost and
that continuing the fight would only cost more lives, wanted to surrender even before the
invasion of Singapore Island. Harold Burfield Taylor, commander of the 22nd Brigade,
assumed that the main defence plan would not succeed and withdrew his troops too
soon. Thus Farrell wrote that:
Public History Review, vol 14, 2007
110
The rank and file of the 8th Australian Division was tired, but not
stupid. They could not have failed to note the attitudes of their
commanders and the lack of clear direction and harmony in the chain
of command. As Percival himself admitted, when no one told them
otherwise they decided the battle was futile. When the front fell apart
and no one stepped forward to restore the situation, many – twice
provoked – gave up. Mass desertion there was, but the main cause is
also clear: left to fend for themselves by an incompetent command,
the troops did just that.41
Four Corners, however, does not seem to be interested in him making this argument in
the programme and it concludes that there was no mass desertion.
Throughout most of its forty-five minutes, Four Corners does not address the
question that it set out to answer on Australians deserting at the fall of Singapore but
constructs an argument that affirms the Anzac mythology about Australian soldiers, just
as it did in Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore fourteen years before. Bean’s ideas that permeated
the 1988 programme are strongly present in No Prisoners. These are principally that the
Australian bush had made Australians the best soldiers because it had created them as
more rugged, more resourceful, more independent and bound together in mateship by
the very ruggedness and trials and tribulations of bush life. In No Prisoners, the country
image of the Australian digger fashioned by Bean is still trotted out as it was in Gallipoli:
The Fatal Shore. The programme uses a quote by David Griffin of the 2/3rd Medical
Auxiliary Corps of the Australian 8th Division in Malaya and Singapore, which follows the
Anzac legend:
It [the Australian 8th Division] was made up of absolutely wonderful
Australians, which are now almost an extinct race, I think… a lot of
country chaps that are absolutely marvellous types of people. Just
marvellous.
Australians are also played up as superior fighters.
A great deal is made of Australians ambushing the Japanese at the Gemencheh
Bridge near Gemas in mid-January 1942, while nothing is heard of Kampar, where
British and Indian troops were able to hold back the Japanese. Masters says of Gemas:
‘The Japanese later said that the Australians fought with a bravery not previously
encountered’. In other words, Four Corners is saying that Australians were the first to
stand up bravely to the Japanese. In contrast, British and Indian troops are mentioned
only in unfavourable terms. Comments, such as the excerpt from Ray Steele, Australian
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veteran from 2/15th Field Regiment at Muar, are not balanced by accounts of stubborn
resistance by Indian troops, such as at Kota Bharu and Kampar:
Ray Steele: As soon as the heat turned on, they didn’t know what to
do. They [an Indian Brigade] finished up, a lot of them, running off –
throwing their rifles away, taking their boots off, and running like hell.
Just as Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore refused to question much of the Anzac mythology, so,
too, does No Prisoners. This means it has trouble dealing with the issue of desertion in
terms of offering an explanation of what happened.
Elphick’s book cites the explanation of Keith Murdoch, a ‘hero’ in the 1988 Four
Corners Gallipoli programme. Murdoch, as Managing Director of the Herald newspaper
group, suggested in August 1942 in a famous article in the Melbourne Herald, that the
very qualities that made up the Anzac legend helped explain the large number of
Australians not at the frontline in the last days of the fall of Singapore. He blamed the
‘distorted tradition of the last war, that discipline is not necessary to attain high fighting
value’ for the indiscipline that led to many Australian soldiers to fend for themselves
rather than stay in disciplined formations at the front. Murdoch remarked that ‘it was
notable that the men who did not stand were the boozy “tough” men who had always had
wrong ideas of discipline and were noisy and boastful’. He was also critical of the aspect
of the Anzac legend that said Australians were the best fighters and that others were
inferior at the fall of Singapore: ‘Our own part was marred by a constant jarring and
belittlement of our British and Indian comrades’ and this ‘led to inadequate cohesion in
the battlefield and did no good to our own morale: troops are not helped by being told
that those on their flanks are unreliable’.42 In Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore, Four Corners
had drawn upon Murdoch extensively and praised him as a frank journalist when he was
upholding the Anzac legend in 1915. But when he was scrutinising it in 1942 he was
ignored by the programme.
Many viewers responding in the No Prisoners’ online forum expressed admiration for
the programme for upholding the Anzac mythology: they despised Elphick for
questioning it. They also remarked that the programme was in the tradition of Four
Corners’ investigative journalism style.43 ‘Shirley N’ commented: ‘I would like to again
congratulate Four Corners on a great piece of insightful history on our war time past.
This is a great objective piece of journalism by Chris Masters and his team and important
to recognise these incredible brave Australian blokes’. ‘S Rogers’ wrote: ‘Yet again,
another excellent program by Four Corners. I’m a Brit living in Australia and I’d like to say
that’s lucky for my countryman Mr. Elphick. What an arrogant bloke and someone should
take this ignorant, bombastic twit to the cleaners. Legally of course!’ ‘Garry’ compared
No Prisoners to Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore: ‘Thank you very much for the excellent
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program, like The Fatal Shore it was very informative and didn’t pull any punches. I look
forward to more of these programs from you and your team.’ What is significant with No
Prisoners is that viewers saw its approach as that of examining the Anzac legend within
the tradition of Four Corners of ‘exposing the truth’ through an investigative style that
makes out a partisan argument. The programme did have an argument, but that
argument was not to question the Anzac mythology; it was to cross examine anyone
questioning the Anzac legend, principally Elphick.
Both Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore and No Prisoners offer insights into how the
investigative journalism style of Four Corners is applied from current affairs to historical
documentary making. In this process, there was little rigorous examination of the ‘truth’
behind the Anzac mythology that can be found in the printed work of historians. In the
Four Corners’ current affairs programmes, partiality is deemed acceptable if it is in the
‘public interest’, which equates in this instance with shoring up old nationalist certainties
in an unstable cultural environment. In its historical documentary making, Four Corners
did not ‘expose the truth’ but obscured it by simply arguing one view in a complex
historical debate. This confirms the point made by scholars of television history that the
medium in its current form is not amenable to drawing out historiographical debates but
is driven by the needs of a simple, linear narrative story telling structure.
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